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Event Composition and Event Individuation
Robert Truswell
1 Introduction
This chapter explores a consequence of Davidson’s (1967) foundational hypothesis that
events are in some nontrivial way similar to individuals:1 just as an individual can form
part of a larger individual, an event can form part of a larger event. This implies that
events may be composed of multiple smaller events. We call this phenomenon event
composition.
A related issue is the individuation of events. The semantic structures we de-
scribe below imply a very large, richly structured, domain of events, including many
events that are not likely to correspond to cognitively or linguistically relevant units.
The question of the individuation of events is the question of which subset of the do-
main of events is cognitively or linguistically relevant. To approach this question, we
supplement our logical semantics of event composition with a set of statements about
cognitive and linguistic constraints on event individuation.
Below, we introduce composition relations for individuals and events (Section 2),
and then turn in Section 3 to perceptual and cognitive constraints on event individu-
ation. Finally, Section 4 discusses linguistic aspects of event composition and event
individuation.
2 Foundations
In model-theoretic semantics, individuals are characterized set-theoretically: they are
members of the domain of individuals, De, typically a denumerably infinite set par-
titioned into two classes, constants and variables. There is no direct relationship be-
tween this logical characterization and any given class of cognitive or perceptual ob-
jects, though. How do we know when we have encountered an individual? How do we
recognize the members of that set? Such questions are everywhere when logical and
cognitive approaches to semantics meet.
Logical individuals certainly do not match our intuitive notion of individual. For
instance, London, justice, and the Boston Red Sox (the team) are arguably all logical
individuals, but this seems intuitively absurd: London (see Chomsky 2000) is a city,
a strange, amorphous region defined in partly political and partly geographical terms,
1I adopt this formulation as it is neutral between two possibilities: that events simply are individuals, or
that the domain of events is disjoint from the domain of individuals, but has a similar structure. We will not
distinguish between these options.
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which also functions as a sort of club with gradient membership (some people are
Londoners born and bred; many are definitely not Londoners; some are in between in
different ways). Justice is intangible, an abstract concept that is ‘done’ or ‘served’ but,
unlike many other things that are done (ballroom dancing, for instance), is somehow
not event-like. We have quite clear intuitions about what constitutes justice, but do
we really see an individual here? Finally, the Boston Red Sox—that’s nine individuals
(plus substitutes and coaches, etc.), not one.
We will not even try to bridge the gap between the logical definition of ‘individual’
and our intuitions about individuals. ‘Individual’, as a term in our logical vocabulary,
is better characterized in terms of its relations to other parts of the logical vocabulary.
Model-theoretic individuals are primitive elements from which other categories (such
as predicates) are recursively constructed, and how that relates to any perceptually
grounded intuitions about what counts as an individual is a separate question.
However, there are regular correspondences between syntactic constituents and
their model-theoretic translations, and these correspondences can help us relate in-
dividuals as logical units and as cognitive units. If our compositional semantic theories
include hypotheses about which natural language constituents denote logical individ-
uals, and we have intuitions about perceptual correlates of those constituents, then we
can infer rules of thumb, imprecise but still useful, about perceptual correlates of the
logical notion of individual.
Here are two rules of thumb about natural language and logical individuals:
1. Noun phrases canonically denote individuals.
2. Individuals canonically function as arguments to first-order predicates.
The qualification ‘canonically’ is important: there is no way to determine a priori
the denotation of natural language constituents. Indeed, there are several well-known
exceptions to these rules of thumb (quantified noun phrases, for example, are usually
assumed to denote objects of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉 rather than e), but these heuristics show
the virtue of intuitively outlandish claims that London, or justice, or the Boston Red
Sox, are individuals. First, London. justice, and the Boston Red Sox are noun phrases;
secondly, their denotations can all function as arguments to first-order predicates. In
these respects, they behave just like the prototypically individual-denoting proper name
Jeremy Clarkson:
(1) a. (i) London is annoying / I resent London.
(ii) Jeremy Clarkson is annoying / I resent Jeremy Clarkson.
b. (i) Justice has been served / I want justice.
(ii) Jeremy Clarkson has been served / I want Jeremy Clarkson.
c. (i) The Red Sox never make it easy for their supporters / Many people
still support the Red Sox.
(ii) Jeremy Clarkson never makes it easy for his supporters / Many peo-
ple still support Jeremy Clarkson.
Now, the crucial point: if London is an individual in this sense, then so is Camden, or
the Tube, despite the fact that these are subparts of London. England and Europe are
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individuals, despite the fact that London is part of these. The same goes for the Red
Sox: if the Red Sox is an individual, then Dustin Pedroia and Major League Baseball
are individuals too.
This tells us something about De: individuals can be part of other individuals. This
is probably not true of the pre-theoretical, perceptually grounded notion of ‘individual’
(although I believe that Jeremy Clarkson is an individual, I do not believe that his
eyebrows are also individuals), but there you go.
Following Link (1983), I assume a range of mereological, or part–whole, relations
among individuals. Link distinguishes between atomic individuals and plural indi-
viduals, approximately mirroring the singular–plural distinction found in many natural
languages. John and Mary denote atomic individuals (say j and m respectively), but
the coordinate noun phrase John and Mary still denotes an individual, according to the
above rules of thumb: aside from the fact that it triggers plural agreement, the distri-
bution of John and Mary is very similar to the distribution of John. For example, both
can function as arguments to predicates like danced. If we believe that danced denotes
a predicate of type 〈e, t〉, then it would make sense for both John and John and Mary
to be of type e.2 Accordingly, we say that John and Mary denotes the plural individual
j⊕m, and that j and m are individual parts of j⊕m.3 An atomic individual is then
an individual with no proper individual parts.
Even atomic individuals have parts, though. John has four limbs and 20 digits
and 32 teeth and 206 bones and a nose, but these are not individuals independent of
John, in the sense in which John remains an individual even when considered as part
of j⊕m. We do not look at John and see 264 individuals; we see only j. Nevertheless,
there is a mereological relation between John’s nose (call it n) and John: the stuff that
constitutes n is a material part of the stuff that constitutes j, even though it is not an
individual part of j (because j is an atomic individual, and atomic individuals do not
have individual parts). All individual parts of an individual x are also material parts of
x, but there may be material parts of x which are not individual parts of x.
These mereological relations among individuals are pervasive. Capturing those re-
lations requires a domain of individuals with a surprisingly rich structure. For example,
Link’s analysis entails that multiple individuals can be spatiotemporally coextensive.
Link argues that this is correct, as a new ring can be made from old gold. The gold and
the ring are coextensive, but must be different individuals, if we assume that oldness
and newness are mutually exclusive and that a single individual cannot have mutually
exclusive properties.
If events are similar to individuals, we expect the domain of events to be similarly
structured. Indeed, it is: a sphere can rotate quickly while heating up slowly (example
modified from Davidson 1969). Assuming that quickness and slowness are mutually
exclusive, the rotating event and the heating-up event must be distinct, despite being
spatiotemporally coextensive.4 This chapter examines mereological relations between
2We disregard the possibility that John and Mary denotes a quantifier, for space reasons.
3Following Link, I use the symbol ⊕ for this individual sum relation, and + for a material sum relation
to be introduced presently. For all x1,x2, x1 and x2 are material parts of x1 +x2; x1 and x2 are individual parts
of x1⊕ x2. I also use x1 ⊆ x2, x1 ⊂ x2 for ‘x1 is a part (or proper part, respectively) of x2’.
4Davidson (1969) proposed that events are identical iff they have the same causes and effects. It is
possible that the spinning causes the heating, further suggesting that the two events are distinct.
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atomic events and their material parts; see Lohndal’s chapter in this volume for discus-
sion of plural events.
We begin by characterizing a relation of event composition, on analogy with in-
dividuals. Link’s logic entails that for any atomic or plural individual x, there is some
stuff (or portion of material) that constitutes x. Moreover, stuff can be subdivided
arbitrarily. Finally, portions of stuff are individuals in their own right. These consid-
erations jointly entail that any individual x can be subdivided into a set of individuals
{x1, . . . ,xn}, none of which have any material parts in common, which jointly consti-
tute x (the stuff constituting x is the same stuff constituting x1 + . . .+ xn). We will say
that x is composed of {x1, . . . ,xn}.
Analogues of all of the above can be found in the domain of events (see Bach 1986:
5, where the relation ‘events:processes :: things:stuff’ was proposed). Specifically,
the relationship between stuff and atomic individuals mirrors the relationship between
stuff and atomic events.5 Just as an atomic individual can be composed of a set of
portions of stuff, so can an event. That is, a relationship of event composition can
hold between a set of portions of stuff and an atomic event. We will also talk about
decomposition of an event into a set of subevents. This is to be taken as the converse
of event composition.
To illustrate these concepts, consider (2).
(2) Michael built a snowman.
Following Davidson, (2) denotes the proposition that there exists an event temporally
located prior to speech time, of snowman-building carried out by Michael. However,
building a snowman has its own internal structure: you roll a giant snowball for the
body by pushing a smaller snowball through a patch of snow, roll another for the head,
and adorn the result with carrots and scarves. Each of those steps is an event in its own
right; jointly, they compose the snowman-building event.
Events can be decomposed recursively. Pushing a giant snowball around is a pro-
cess which stops when you have a sufficiently giant snowball. This process is com-
posed of a series of iterable smaller events of taking a step and rolling a snowball in
front of you. Taking a step involves coordinating a set of muscle movements: inter-
nally very complex, even if we, as adults, now often take the complexity for granted (if
you don’t believe me, ask my baby son). Muscle movements are probably really about
things happening to electrons and ions, for all I know.
This suggests that the domain of events has a similar structure to the domain of
individuals: there are discrete atomic events and continuous portions of stuff which
can be summed and subdivided arbitrarily. One mereological relation tells us which
portions of stuff are part of which events, a second relation, beyond the scope of this
chapter, relates atomic events to plural events. Finally, a relation of event composition
holds between an atomic event e and a set of nonoverlapping events {e1, . . . ,en}, such
that the same stuff constitutes e and e1 + . . .+ en.
5As in the above quote, Bach’s term for the event analogue of stuff was processes. Link (1997) expanded
this use, defining processes as portions of space–time which may be reified as events or as individuals. I
maintain Link’s use of a single term for portions of material underpinning events or states, but avoid the term
processes, which is used in other ways in the literature and below.
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A major question for this chapter is how this mereological structure relates to events
as perceptual and cognitive units, manipulated in our reasoning processes, and as de-
scribed by ‘simple’ natural language predicates.6 Natural language seems to be a good
guide to events as cognitive units (see Zacks and Tversky 2001, Wolff 2003 for evi-
dence of congruence between events as perceptual and linguistic units). Moreover, I
assume that simple linguistic event descriptions pick out atomic events. The question
then is, what kind of sets of events can simple event descriptions denote? Or turning
the question on its head, what can we learn about linguistic event descriptions, and
perhaps about events as cognitive units, by examining their denotations in a relatively
highly structured domain like the domain of events described above?
We approach this question through the lens of some foundational aspectual distinc-
tions. First, apart from microscopic modifications, if Michael built a snowman is a
true description of some event e, it is not also a true description of any e′ ⊂ e. In the
terms of Krifka (1989), snowman-building events are quantized. Quantization con-
trasts with cumulativity: for a given snowball s, any event e1 of pushing s, combined
with a contiguous event e2 of pushing s, gives a larger event e1 + e2, which is also an
event of pushing s. Snowball-pushing is cumulative, and (with one exception, which
we ignore) quantized events cannot be cumulative events, or vice versa.
Quantization and cumulativity can be used to characterize linguistically and per-
ceptually relevant event types, or ‘shapes’, reflected in a fixed set of aspectual classes
(see Mittwoch’s chapter, and work such as Moens and Steedman 1988, Pustejovsky
1991, and Ramchand 2008 for various proposals as to the form and causal origin of
those templates). For instance, telic, or bounded events (as described by accomplish-
ment predicates, e.g. build a snowman, or achievement predicates) are quantized, while
atelic, or unbounded events (as described by activity predicates, e.g. push a snowball,
or stative predicates) are cumulative. The telos, or culmination, of a telic event is a dis-
tinguished point in the event, which Vendler (1957: 145) characterizes as ‘a “climax,”
which has to be reached if the action is to be what it is claimed to be.’ For each telic
event, there is precisely one culmination, and this guarantees that telic events are quan-
tized: summing two telic events produces an event with more than one culmination,
which is therefore not a telic event. An atelic event lacks a characteristic culmination,
which means that atelic events can be cumulative.
There is broad agreement that telic events constitute the major class of linguistically
relevant quantized events. Quantization is a broader notion than telicity, though: there
are other ways to be quantized. Telic events are quantized because they contain exactly
one distinguished subpart (the culmination); any other class of events with exactly
n distinguished subparts will also be quantized. For instance, leave may describe a
quantized event with a distinguished initial subpart. To the best of my knowledge,
there are no linguistically relevant classes of event with distinguished subparts in the
middle (though see discussion of fetch below), with three distinguished subparts, etc.
Because of this, we adopt a common vocabulary here whereby an event consists
maximally of two distinguished subevents, a temporally extended process and an in-
stantaneous culmination at which a result state is reached.7 By including or omitting
6By a ‘simple’ predicate, I mean a noun, adjective, or verb with its arguments, as opposed to a more
complex predicate formed by coordinating VPs, negation of events, etc.
7The decision to focus on process and culmination may be construed as implying a hypothesis that these
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these two components, we derive Vendler’s four aspectual classes.
1. Culminated processes (process + culmination)  accomplishment predicates
(e.g. run a mile)
2. processes activity predicates (e.g. run)
3. culminations achievement predicates (e.g. hiccup)
4. /0 (neither process nor culmination) stative predicates (e.g. exist)
Still following Vendler, we adopt diagnostic tests for the presence of a process or cul-
mination. An event with a process is felicitous in the progressive, whereas an event
without a process is only felicitous in the progressive if coerced into (for example) an
iterated reading.
(3) a. John is running a mile.
b. John is running.
c. John is hiccupping [iterated reading only]
d. #John is existing.
Meanwhile, an event with a culmination is infelicitous with for-PPs describing the
temporal extent of the event, again disregarding possible coercion effects.
(4) a. #John ran a mile for five minutes.
b. John ran for five minutes.
c. John hiccupped for five minutes [iterated reading only]
d. John existed for five minutes.
The two subtypes of quantized events (culminations and culminated processes) can be
distinguished on the basis of durativity. Culminated processes are durative in that
they have proper subevents at the same level of granularity. In contrast, culminations
(like dying or hiccupping) are construed as instantaneous. Of course, at a microscopic
level, culminations do have subparts, but those subparts are not linguistically relevant.
Coarse-graining, whereby the internal structure of a given individual or event is lin-
guistically invisible, is pervasive in linguistic descriptions.
Meanwhile, processes and states are distinguished by a dynamic opposition of
forces (see Copley’s chapter): processes often involve change, or at least an equilibrium
resulting from equal and opposing forces, while states describe properties construed as
intrinsically static. In fact, we will disregard states in this chapter, as the vocabulary
we develop below cannot straightforwardly be applied to them.
In Section 3, we discuss properties of events at different scales, from a hiccup to an
ice age. The event shapes distinguished above give a unifying organizational principle
across events on different scales: events, at any level of granularity, can be partitioned
into the same four classes. In other words, the forms remain the same; the perceptual
basis for individuating events according to those forms varies.
define the linguistically relevant event shapes, or as a case study illustrating the kinds of issues that arise in
the study of event composition and individuation, according to the taste of the reader.
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3 Constraints on Event Individuation
The mereological relations sketched in Section 2 are in principle unlimited in scope:
any event, or any individual, can be decomposed into smaller parts. This means that we
can generate arbitrary individuals and events: we can decompose any two events e and
e′ into arbitrary sets {e1, . . . ,en},{e′1, . . . ,e′n} of subevents, then compose any ei + e′j
into a new event. Logically, this is as it should be. However, it is natural to complement
this logic with a characterization of cognitively relevant events. To put it another way,
Section 2 sketched general purpose tools for relating events to subevents; now we want
to know when we actually use those tools. This is the question of event individuation.8
Our starting point is the relation between process and culmination in a culminated
process. It is often assumed (e.g. McCawley 1968, Dowty 1979) that the process is
related to the culmination by a causal relation such as ‘directly causes’ or ‘leads to’.
That is indeed often the case: if a falling rock smashes a vase, then the rock follows
a particular trajectory, which directly causes the breaking of the vase. Likewise, if an
author writes a novel, there is a writing process which directly causes the existence
of the novel.9 However, discussion in Davidson (1969) showed that the directness
of direct causation is quite elusive: A may kill B by pouring poison into his bottle
of scotch, but that action did not directly cause B to die in any obvious sense: adding
poison to the scotch could be separated from B’s death by any amount of spatiotemporal
distance, and requires assistance from B (who must consume some of the scotch if A is
to successfully kill him). We may agree that A killed B in this scenario, but this does
not mean that A’s actions (the process) directly caused B’s death (the culmination)—
see also Fodor (1970). In fact, Copley and Harley (2015) discuss several linguistic
structures suggesting that the relationship between process and culmination cannot be
one of direct causation, at least not in the actual world. The occurrence of the process
component of a culminated process does not entail the occurrence of the culmination,
when on any commonsense definition of direct causation, it should.10
The best-known example of this is the so-called imperfective paradox (Dowty
1979, among many others).11 The progressive form of an activity predicate is taken to
entail the perfect variant, as in (5).
8Davidson (1969) coined the phrase the individuation of events. Davidson’s concern in that paper is
rather different from our concern here, though: he is concerned with identity relations among events, or
when statements of the form ιe.P1(e) = ιe.P2(e) are true.
9Even here, things are more strained, in that there is no instantaneous appearance of the book. As with
many acts of creation, an author writing a book engages in a process which incrementally brings the book
to completion, and the book is finished when the author decides. This is related to the distinction between
culminated processes which are measured out by their objects, in that there is a homomorphic mapping
between subparts of the event and of the object, and culminated processes where the subparts of the event bear
no such direct relation to the subparts of the object. See chapters by Mittwoch and Verkuyl, and references
therein.
10Causation is commonly treated as a counterfactual dependency (Lewis 1973, Dowty 1979; see Copley
and Wolff 2014 for critical discussion): if C causes E, then in the most accessible worlds like w0, if C
hadn’t happened then E wouldn’t have happened. Such dependencies can be grouped into causal chains: e1
causes e2, which causes e3; if e1 hadn’t happened then e2 wouldn’t have happened; if e2 hadn’t happened
then e3 wouldn’t have happened. A relation of direct causation holds in a 2-member causal chain, with no
intermediate events at the same level of granularity.
11As discussed in Mittwoch’s chapter, it is now widely accepted that the imperfective paradox is not
actually a paradox, but rather a data point that should shape our theories. The name, however, has stuck.
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(5) a. John was running. →
b. John has run.
However, the progressive form of an accomplishment predicate usually entails the pro-
cess, but not the culmination. That is, (6a) entails (6b) and (6c), but not (6d).
(6) a. John was painting a still life. →
b. John was painting. →
c. John has painted. [More idiomatic: John has done some painting.] 6→
d. John has painted/will have painted a still life.
The reason for this failure of entailment concerns the semantics of the different as-
pectual forms. (5a) describes an ongoing cumulative event of John running, with the
reference time situated within the event time. Because running is cumulative, if some
portion of the event time precedes the reference time, we can conclude that some part of
the process of John running has already taken place: John has run. In contrast, painting
a still life is quantized (a cumulative process). If the reference time is situated within
the event time, that means that some portion of the process has taken place: John has
done some painting. However, the cumulation (the completion of the still life) is still
in the future, and consequently may not be reached. We therefore cannot conclude that
John has painted a still life: (7a) is a contradiction, but (7b) is not.
(7) a. #John may have been running yesterday, but John has still never (success-
fully) run.
b. John may have been painting a still life yesterday, but John has still never
(successfully) painted a still life.
All of this seems at odds with any representation in which the process directly causes
the culmination: (7b) shows that the former can occur without the latter, while causation-
based theories of aspectual class yoke the two together. In his influential analysis,
Dowty included a modal component in his analysis of the progressive, reconciling the
imperfective paradox with his analysis of accomplishment predicates as lexicalized in-
stances of direct causation. For Dowty, if John is painting a still life, then the still life
may not be completed in w0, the actual world, but it is completed in all inertia worlds,
in which there are no unforeseen interruptions to the normal course of events.
A second case comes from the now widely documented phenomenon of non-
culminating accomplishments (see Travis 2000, Bar-El et al. 2005, and Mittwoch and
Travis’ chapters in this volume). In a range of typologically unrelated languages, the
culmination component of an accomplishment predicate is an implicature rather than
an entailment, and can be explicitly contradicted. Examples from Malagasy (8a) and
St’át’imcets (8b) (both from Copley and Harley 2015) are below; Mittwoch’s chapter








































‘I made the basket, but it didn’t get finished’ (Bar-El et al. 2005:90)
Phenomena like the progressive and non-culminating accomplishments raise doubts
about analyses which implicate direct causation in the subevent structure of culminated
processes; one advantage of the mereological approach sketched in Section 2 is that it
places less emphasis on causation as the ‘glue’ relating subevents. In fact, I will claim
that the nature of the relationship between process and culmination depends on the
perceptual nature of the event itself.
Returning to our discussion of snowman-building from Section 2, note that events
at different scales have quite different characters (see also Zacks and Tversky 2001).
The smallest events we observe are characterized in purely physical terms: a snowflake
falls, or muscles contract as people move. At a slightly larger scale, we are aware of
the alternating pattern of more-or-less bounded movements of the limbs: although it is
difficult to decide precisely where one step stops and the next starts, we readily accept
that we have seen a string of steps. At coarser grains still, such as the rolling of a giant
snowball, events are identified by the perceived intentions and goals of agents. For
example, Dowty (1979) discusses pauses in events: we recognize an event of Michael
rolling a snowball even if he took a breather in the middle, or left the scene to recruit
friends to help. I take this (unlike Dowty) to be related to a perceived continuity of
intention in such cases, even if there is no corresponding continuity of action (see also
Tovena 2011). Larger still, a war starts and ends according to a diplomatic process
(declaration of war, ceasefire) quite remote from events on the ground. Likewise, most
of the activity in an Apollo mission happens on the ground—the spacecraft moving
through space is just the tip of the iceberg. However, there is no perfect correlation
between the size of an event, construed as its spatiotemporal extent, and its perceived
physical, intentional, or other nature. An actor’s raised eyebrow might be an exquisitely
planned intentional event, but it is still small in scale compared to some physical events
like natural disasters.
I will introduce a set of labels for these different event types. I refer to physical
changes and interactions among physical objects as physical events. Events individu-
ated on the basis of inferred intentions and their quasi-causal effects (Michotte 1954,
Woodward 1998) are intentional events. Strategic events are initiated by directors
(whether playwrights or presidents) who effectively control the actions of possibly
quite remote individuals or groups in a ‘strategic’ way (a deliberately vague charac-
terization under which I hope to group everything from a shepherd’s control of a herd
of sheep through the intermediary of a dog in a sheepdog trial, to the role of the com-
poser and the librettist in an opera, or that of an arch-manipulator using the power of
suggestion to get his own way). Finally, an analyst may postulate an analytical event,
by uncovering order in a set of happenings that was not apparent to any individual
present at the time (emergent phenomena like stock market crashes or the migration
out of Africa are likely examples; see also Link 1997 on the French revolution). There
are surely other types of perceptually and linguistically relevant events, but we will
















Figure 1: Relations among event types
Each of these event types comes with its own set of well-formedness constraints.
We are more likely to perceive a set of happenings as an atomic event to the extent that
they match these constraints. Moreover, I will suggest that these different event types
form a hierarchy. As diagrammed in Fig. 1, analytical events are distinguished from
other types by not requiring that a distinguished participant (canonically a figure, or
agonist, in Talmy’s 1988 terms) be identified; among the rest, physical events alone do
not attribute intentionality to that distinguished participant, and intentional and strate-
gic events are distinguished by whether the intentional initiator is a direct participant
in the event, or a director, in the sense of Copley (2008).
In the next four subsections, we define these terms and show how they are impli-
cated in the individuation of events of different classes. We begin with physical events
(Section 3.1), and proceed to intentional and strategic events (Sections 3.2 and 3.3,
respectively), before returning to analytical events (Section 3.4). As we pursue this
classification of events, we will keep returning to the set of aspectual classes discussed
in Section 2: each of these four types of events shows the same range of temporal
profiles.
Although we rely on linguistic event descriptions throughout this section, our fo-
cus here is on the events themselves. We discuss further grammatical reflexes of the
different event types in Section 4.
3.1 Physical events
The happenings we perceive as physical events are characterized by a set of common-
sense beliefs about the way the world works sometimes grouped together under the
heading naı̈ve physics (see Smith and Casati 1994 and references therein). The hall-
mark of naı̈ve physical frameworks is that they privilege faithfulness to cognitive rep-
resentations of notions such as causation over detailed and accurate explanation of real-
world physical phenomena. The canonical examples of physical events are inanimate
objects in motion, and the effet Lancement (‘launching effect’) of Michotte (1954),
whereby an object in motion makes contact with a second object, which then begins to
move, as well as related configurations discussed in Talmy (1988).
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Three subtypes of physical events matching the three eventive aspectual classes
are motion and other unbounded physical processes (9); culminations, instantaneous
changes of state (10); and culminated processes (11). The examples below use the
diagnostics from Section 2 to confirm the class of each event description.
(9) a. The river flowed (for five minutes) / the river is flowing.
b. The flag fluttered.
c. The lava cooled.
(10) a. The balloon burst (#for five minutes) / #the balloon is bursting.
b. The vase bounced.
(11) a. The wind blew the ball into the lake (#for five minutes) / The wind is
blowing the ball into the lake.
b. The falling tree crushed the car.
The events described above are dynamic and spatiotemporally continuous: a direct
interaction between a set of one or more objects associated with tendencies to motion
or to rest, as described in Talmy (1988 et seq.). An individual may move in a variety of
ways: a river flowing is fairly stable, while a fluttering flag is less predictable in terms
of both oriention and speed of motion. Instantaneous changes of state like those in (10)
can be construed as spontaneous, without a clearly discernible cause. Finally, causal
relations like those in (11) then often emerge from local interactions between objects
associated with different such tendencies to motion or to rest: the tree has a tendency
to fall, the car has a tendency to stasis, and the tree overcomes the resistance from the
car.
However, physical causation need not be local. A classic example of action at a
distance, or nonlocal physical causation, is turning on a light (intentionally or acci-
dentally) by flicking a switch: the switch can be any distance from the light (it is not
inconceivable that someone at Ground Control can flick a switch and turn on a light on a
space station). The relationship between the switch and the light is otherwise the same
as that between the tree and the car, though. This suggests that physical events are not
always spatially continuous. Causal relations among spatially contiguous events may
well be the canonical case of physical causation, though, as action at a distance tends
to involve a special trigger like a switch, while any moving object can bump into any
other.12
Likewise, pressing a button on a vending machine causes snacks to fall into the tray,
only after five nerve-wracking seconds of indeterminate whirring. This is perceived as
temporal, as opposed to spatial, action at a distance: the button press sets in motion
a chain of obscure events that eventually makes the snacks fall into the tray, but we
have no idea what, if anything, happens during the delay. Although these examples
seem more marginal than spatial action at a distance (a switch could turn a light on
thousands of miles away, but would we really perceive any relatedness in a button
12Of course, microscopically, action at a distance is still spatially contiguous: flicking a switch transmits
a signal through some medium like a wire, and this causes the effect through a chain of local physical causal
relations. The point is that our naı̈ve physics doesn’t see the microscopic intermediate steps, and associates
the more tangible initial cause and final effect directly, an instance of the fairly shallow causal theory that
our naı̈ve physics apparently relies on (see Rozenblit and Keil 2002 on the ‘illusion of explanatory depth’).
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that made chocolate appear in hundreds of years’ time?), physical events can clearly
sometimes be temporally as well as spatially discontinuous.
These examples of causal relations at a spatiotemporal distance are arguably dis-
tinct from cases of caused motion, as event descriptions for the two classes show dif-
ferent patterns of coarse-graining. If a gust of wind blew a ball halfway down the hill,
the ball came to rest, and then a second gust of wind blew the ball to the bottom of
the hill, we can report the path from top to bottom with a single event description: The
ball rolled down the hill or The wind blew the ball down the hill. This shows that the
temporal discontinuity is construed as an insignificant interruption in the event, and
as the discontinuity grows, the impression that the above sentences do not accurately
describe the event grows commensurately. With action at a distance such as flicking a
light switch or using a vending machine, the spatiotemporal remoteness of cause and
effect is part of our understanding of how the system works. It is arguable that the cases
of action at a distance have more in common in this respect with the intentional events
discussed below, with agents and objects such as vending machines sharing the prop-
erty of ‘teleological capability’ (Folli and Harley 2008). I persist, however, in grouping
causation at a distance with physical events here because both types of event require a
causal relation between process and culmination. Little hinges on this if this turns out
to be inaccurate.
3.2 Intentional events
We construe a subset of individuals (primarily animate individuals) as behaving in-
tentionally:13 these individuals have goals, and act rationally to reach those goals. I
will say that a set of events, construed as an agent’s actions aiming at a goal, jointly
compose an intentional event.
Of course, an agent acting intentionally can also be considered as a purely physical
object (animacy entails physicality but not vice versa). This lies behind the ambiguity
of (12)—see also Jackendoff (1972).
(12) John hit the wall.
On one reading, John is just a lump of flesh, flung against a wall. On the other reading,
John acts intentionally, propelling his fist into the wall. The former reading describes
a purely physical event; the latter is intentional.14 Jackendoff (1990) analyses this dis-
tinction by relating intentions to an independent ‘action tier’ in his semantic represen-
tation. This allows him to claim that in the purely physical reading of (12), John is just
a theme, while in the intentional reading, John is both a theme and an agent, maintain-
ing a largely localist approach to thematic roles, in terms of notions like movement of
a theme along a path from source to goal, independent of an agent–patient articulation
closer to the concerns of this section.
13Of course, we may use intentional language nonliterally when discussing purely physical events, for
instance The sun is trying to shine. However, we cannot describe a weather forecast by saying that The sun
is planning to shine at 3pm; nor can we use futurates like The sun is shining soon when the sun is dispersing
cloud cover.
14Bridget Copley (p.c.) notes that the purely physical reading is dispreferred for animate individuals,
suggesting that we prefer to construe animate individuals as acting intentionally.
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Many people claim that the relationship between the intentional event and the phys-
ical event in (12) is causal. For example, in the terminology of Ramchand (2008), we
might say that in the purely physical reading of (12), John is the subject of a process
which causes John to come into contact with the wall. In the intentional reading, John
is also the subject of an initiating event which causes that process. Similar ideas are dis-
cussed at length in Pietroski (2000). However, Kamp (1999−2007) and others (Copley
2010, Truswell 2011) have argued that such approaches are ultimately unsatisfactory:
the relationship between the intentional and the physical event is not merely one of
the intentional event causing a physical event which is independently asserted to exist.
Rather, the intention defines the event, providing the basis for the event’s individuation,
and the action realizes the intention.
One piece of evidence that Kamp adduces for this claim concerns the verb fetch.
Fetching x consists of going to x, taking x, and returning to the original location, specif-
ically with the intention to bring x to that location. In other words, fetching is the
concatenation of three physical events, linked by a common intention. The heterogene-
ity of the physical processes in the service of a common intention suggests that the
intention alone individuates the event.
Related evidence comes from the progressive test described in Section 2. Following
Reichenbach (1947), the progressive locates the reference time within the runtime of
the event itself, and so is used to describe ongoing processes or events en route to
completion. This means that we can use the descriptive content of VP to tell us what
kind of event is ongoing.
A purely physical event description like (13) can felicitously be uttered from the
moment the ball starts moving down the hill, until it reaches the bottom; even (because
of coarse-graining) during a sufficiently brief hiatus in the middle.
(13) The ball is rolling down the hill.
(13) cannot be uttered before the ball starts moving, even if it is clear that the ball is
about to roll down the hill (because the wind is picking up, for example); and (13)
cannot be uttered when the ball reaches the bottom, even if it carries on moving. The
progression from top to bottom delimits the event.
Intentional events can be bigger than this. More specifically, they can start earlier.
If we see a round man limbering up at the top of a hill, and we infer that he is preparing
to roll down it, we can use a futurate progressive like (14) (see Copley 2008).15
(14) Hey, look! The round man is rolling down the hill!
When we say this, the round man is not necessarily moving down the hill at all, but we
infer his intention, and also infer that his current actions might rationally be expected
15In fact, futurate variants of (13), such as The ball is rolling down the hill at 3pm next Tuesday, are also
possible, but report on strategic events, in the terms used here: as discussed below, futurate progressives
report on plans, and plans reside in minds. As none of the participants in (13) have a mind, we interpret such
futurates as describing the plans of a director rather than an agent. Although the verb bears present tense
inflection in futurates like this, the time adverbial is a clue that the runtime of the event described does not
overlap with speech time. Hey, look! in (14) instructs the listener to pay attention to plans inferrable on the
basis of current actions. These may be larger than physical events, while still being smaller than the types of
plans described by futurates.
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to lead to fulfilment of that intention. That is enough for the round man’s limbering up
to count as part of a rolling-down-the-hill event: the physical rolling down the hill is a
proper subpart of the intentional rolling down the hill, and we can use (14) to describe
the ongoing intentional event.
Similar effects are reported, from a different perspective, in Wolff (2003). In a se-
ries of experiments, Wolff showed that purely physical events were often characterized
by direct causation, but that intentional events could be more inclusive.16 One example
of this distinction involved a pair of animations. In the first, three marbles were shown.
The first marble rolled into the second, which in turn rolled into the third. In the other
animation, the first marble was replaced by a hand, which pushed the second mar-
ble into the third. Although the physical relations are essentially identical in the two
cases, participants reported seeing two distinct events in the first animation, but only a
single event in the second animation. As a linguistic correlate of this, participants typ-
ically described the chain of causal relations in the first experiment using periphrastic
causatives like (15b), but could describe the second animation using lexical causatives
like (16a).
(15) a. #The red marble moved the blue marble.
b. The red marble made the blue marble move.
(16) a. The man moved the blue marble.
b. The man made the blue marble move.
Wolff interprets this as showing that perceived intention increases the likelihood of a
single-event construal: participants infer that when the hand pushes one marble, the
agent intended to move the other marble, and that moving the first marble enables him
to move the second. That licenses perception of a single event.
This suggests that intentional events are bipartite: they are actions (processes) re-
lated to a goal (a culmination). As with physical events, intentional processes and in-
tentional culminations can be found in isolation, or combined in a culminated process.
These three possibilities are illustrated in (17)–(19).
(17) a. John is working out.
b. John worked out for hours.
(18) a. John is spitting. [Iterated reading only]
b. John spat for hours. [Iterated reading only]
(19) a. John is building a snowman.
b. John built a snowman #for five minutes.
In at least the case of the culmination (18), the physical event of spitting is coextensive
with the intentional event of spitting; in the other cases, as with Kamp’s example of
fetch, it is certainly not guaranteed that there is a single recognizable physical event that
corresponds to the range of activities involved in working out or in building a snowman
(see again Kamp 1999−2007, Tovena 2011). Similarly, working out subsumes a range
of physically quite distinct activities. There is no clear physical continuity between
16I have modified Wolff’s terminology for consistency with the rest of this chapter.
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doing sit-ups and using a rowing machine, for example. It is only the continuity of
intention that justifies the grouping of such disparate activities together as a single
event.
Plan and goal differ from cause and effect in that a cause produces an effect,
whereas a plan may not lead to its goal.17 Related differences are linguistically en-
coded in several languages. Perhaps the best-known is the Tagalog distinction between
‘neutral’ and ‘ability and involuntary action (AIA)’ verb forms (Dell 1983; see also
Travis’ chapter). The neutral forms encode intention but not causation, while the AIA
forms entail causation. Accordingly, one can simultaneously assert the neutral form

























‘Pedro went to Manila but got lost and didn’t get there.’ (Dell 1983: 180)
A related phenomenon concerns the interpretation of verbs like offer (Oehrle 1976,
Martin and Schäfer 2012). Offer can take an animate or inanimate subject, with a
difference in interpretation. If an agent offers x to y (21a), she intends that y has a
chance to take x, but y may refuse. However, if a nonagentive subject offers x to y, the
































































‘Her excellent result offered her first place, but she didn’t take it.’ (Martin
and Schäfer 2012: 248)
Intentional events necessarily involve action: an intention does not determine an in-
tentional event unless the agent is actually doing something about it.18 I intend to die
happy and fulfilled, but that is not sufficient to license utterances like (22) in my current
state (quite healthy, thank you very much).
(22) #Rob is dying happy and fulfilled.
There are further constraints on how perceived actions relate to inferred intentions. In
particular, the speaker, with limited knowledge of the agent’s intentions, must be able
17It is of course possible to construe intentional events as encoding a modal form of causation, following
Dowty (1979). In that case, the question at issue is the nature of the modal base and ordering source.
18In contrast, the futurates discussed in Copley (2008) typically presuppose that the agent is able to bring
about the intended event, but may not be doing anything at speech time.
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to infer the intention on the basis of the observed action. This constrains the size of the
intentional events described: only actions stereotypically related to a specific goal are
likely to form part of an intentional event description. For example, we cannot utter
(14) if we see the round man at home, eating breakfast before heading to the hillside:
even if the round man knows that he is eating a hearty breakfast to prepare himself for
the ordeal that lies ahead, we typically would not look at the breakfast and infer a link
to a plan to roll down a hill. Likewise, we cannot use (14) if the round man is limbering
up, at the top of the hill, intending to BASE jump off the summit, but we know that the
wind is picking up, and will send him rolling down the hill before he gets a chance to
jump. In the first of these cases, the action of eating breakfast does not make the round
man’s intentions manifest to a typical observer; in the second, we know that the action
will lead to a culmination other than the intended one; but we cannot describe that
combination of an intention and an unintended culmination with a single verb. This
tells us that action and goal form a bipartite structure, analogous to cause and effect in
physical events.
The relationship between action and goal in an intentional event should satisfy at
least the following constraints.
1. The agent must believe that there is a relationship of causation or enablement
between action and goal.
2. The agent’s action must be part of a plan, evident to the speaker, to reach the
goal.
3. The plan in question must be minimal, in a sense to which we return below.
The first condition excludes cases where an observer can see consequences of an
agent’s action that an agent cannot. For example, let us assume that a common out-
come of rolling down hills is broken ribs. A common trait among round men who roll
down hills is blissful ignorance of the dangers they face. When the round man is lim-
bering up, we might know that he is preparing to do something that will land him in
hospital, but that is not part of the round man’s plan. We can still felicitously say (14),
but we cannot say (23).
(23) #Look! The round man is breaking his ribs!
The second condition is intended as a guarantee of perceived rationality on the part of
the agent. Although there is no guarantee that the agent is actually acting rationally, ra-
tional plans stand in more predictable relations to observable events. Intentional events
are therefore easier to perceive and describe to the extent that the plans underpinning
them are rational. It is not enough for the agent to see a link between his actions and
goals; the speaker must see the link and expect his audience to see the link.
The third condition imposes a minimality requirement on the plans underpinning
intentional events. We can think of a plan as roughly analogous to a chain.19 The
19Only roughly analogous, because plans can contain multiple independent subplans. Subplans can also
act simultaneously as steps towards multiple independent goals. Formally, although plans can be modelled
to an extent as a partially ordered set of steps, they certainly do not have to be total orders, as suggested by
the metaphor of a chain (see also Jackendoff 2007). We disregard these complexities here, assuming that the
discussion here can be extended to more complex structures.
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intention behind the minimality condition is that elements of that chain must all be
related in certain ways, so that there can be no superfluous links in the chain. A rough
formulation of the minimality condition is in (24).
(24) Minimality condition on plans
A minimal plan consists of a series of steps, s1, . . . ,sn, such that:
a. for each si,si+1 (1≤ i < n), si either causes or enables si+1, and
b. no well-formed plan can arise from omission of any step si (1≤ i < n).
The point of the minimality condition is that intentional events can be more temporally
discontinuous than physical events. We saw that only small pauses could be included
within physical events, but plans can be put on hold almost indefinitely before they are
resumed. The process of building a house involves a lot of building activity, and two
types of non-building activity. On the one hand, there are the preparatory activities, the
builder’s equivalent of the round man limbering up; on the other hand, there are pauses
in the activity of varying lengths where the builder is not engaged in anything directly
related to the building of the house. The builder goes home every afternoon, and may
disappear for a few days to work on something else altogether. In Canada, a lot of
construction work grinds to a halt for weeks or months in the depths of winter. All
of these pauses are normal, or even inevitable, but they are of a different status to the
preparatory activities. Without the preparatory activities, the house wouldn’t get built;
without the pauses, the house would still be built. The preparatory activities are part of
a minimal plan as characterized above; the pauses are not, and can only be included as
part of an intentional house-building event if coarse-graining allows us to ignore them.
Such coarse-graining is vague, and partially contextually determined: because Cana-
dian winters are more severe than British winters, Canadians expect long pauses in con-
struction activity over winter, whereas British people do not. In Canada, it is normal
to say that someone is building a house next door, even if cold weather has prevented
any progress for months. In Britain, if nothing happened for months, people would
probably assume that the project had hit the rocks.
In other words, intentional events, like physical events, tolerate discontinuities.
The discontinuities can be individually longer than discontinuities in typical physical
events, and can occupy a greater proportion of the event’s runtime. Such discontinuities
require us to admit a process of coarse-graining whereby possibly quite large breaks in
an activity are subsumed within an ongoing perceived continuity of intention. But not
every discontinuity can be coarse-grained away like this. The minimality condition on
plans guarantees that actions unrelated to the goal of building a house do not count as
part of a house-building event.
To summarize, there are several formal similarities between causes and effects in
physical events, and actions and goals in intentional events. The differences that do
exist between causal and intentional relations can largely be ascribed to differences
between our perception of the two types of relation. We perceive physical causes as
having almost inevitable, typically proximal effects, but we can see an action as part of
a plan to reach a remote goal. As a result, intentional events often have more remote
culminations than physical events, the process leading to the culmination can be more
internally differentiated in intentional events (because different preparatory steps can
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be unified by a common intention), and it is more likely that the culmination is never
reached.
3.3 Strategic events
Strategic events are similar to intentional events in that the coherence of the stuff con-
stituting such an event is linked to an individual’s intention. However, the agent in an
intentional event is a participant in the event, whereas in a strategic event, the intention
may lie with someone who is not an event participant, or may not even be present when
the event takes place. In other words, strategic events are related to established plans
which may not be related to perceived actions, while intentional events are related to
plans inferred from perceived actions. This means that every intentional event is a
strategic event, but not vice versa.
Strategic events are the objects described by Copley’s (2008) analysis of futurate
progressives (25), and I will adopt her term of director to describe the individual whose
plan characterizes a strategic event. Strategic events are different from physical and
intentional events in that although the event is characterized by the director’s intention,
the director need not directly participate in the event.
(25) The Red Sox are playing the Yankees tomorrow. (Copley 2008: 261)
The following conditions hold of strategic events:
1. The director is believed to be able to realize the plan.
2. There is a relationship of causation or enablement between the actions of agen-
tive event participants and the plan of a director.
3. The plan is minimal, as above.
Although the definitions are not quite parallel, I intend intentional events as a special
case of strategic events where the agent is identified with the director and the plan is
inferred from observed actions. We could also define a complement set of ‘strictly
strategic events’ which are not intentional events (at least one agent is disjoint from the
director).
Strategic events show increased flexibility in the relationship between an agent’s
actions and the plan: an agent acts intentionally with respect to some goal, but that
goal may or may not be shared with a director.
Just as Kamp’s (1999−2007) discussion of fetching showed that intentional events
are distinct from physical events, we can argue that strategic events are distinct from in-
tentional events by demonstrating that heterogeneous agentive actions can correspond
to the stable intention of a director, and that the director’s stable intention is the ba-
sis for individuation of the event. For example, consider a homeowner who wants to
sell his house. The homeowner may take the single step of employing an estate agent
who will sell his house on his behalf. This is sufficient for the estate agent to assume
the intention to sell the house and to act towards that goal (placing adverts, organiz-
ing viewings, etc.). In the meantime, the homeowner goes about his daily business
and never thinks about selling the house: there is no way of observing the homeowner
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during these weeks and inferring an intention to sell the house. At virtually no point
during this period can someone point at the homeowner’s actions and say (26).
(26) Hey, look! The homeowner is selling his house.
Months pass, nothing happens, and the homeowner comes to believe that the estate
agent is not working hard enough. He fires the estate agent and employs a different one
instead. At this point, the first estate agent stops acting with a goal of selling the house,
and the second estate agent starts doing so. The homeowner goes back to not thinking
about the house. Weeks pass, and the house is sold. The homeowner says:
(27) I finally sold the house.20
What is the homeowner’s involvement in this process? Mainly, he delegates: he tells
other people to align their intentions with his. The estate agents’ actions fulfil the
homeowner’s intention, a phenomenon known as secondary agentivity. The home-
owner may well have had no involvement in the actual sale, but it is the homeowner’s
intention that characterizes the event: neither estate agent is involved with the house for
the duration of the efforts to sell the house, and other agents, answerable to an estate
agent and responsible for smaller tasks such as the preparation of adverts, are involved
for even shorter time periods.
Non-agent directors are also detectable in a certain class of rationale clauses. A
typical rationale clause, as in (28), is attached to a VP describing an intentional event,
and describes the goal of that event.
(28) I [[came here] [to talk about crime]].
Because intentional events involve action, stative predicates generally resist rationale
clauses.
(29) #I [[have a mouth] [to talk about crime]].
However, a rationale clause can also describe a non-agent director’s intentions. In those
cases, the restriction on stative main clauses is lifted. In cases like (30a), the statue
does not intend to scare the children away, but the creator of the statue does. (30b),
describing a physical disposition in the terms of Copley and Wolff (2014), is from
Williams (1985: 310–11), who writes that ‘we must . . . suppose that there is some
purposeful agent (evolution, God) under whose control is the circumstance “grass is
green”. This is quite different from saying that God or evolution is an Agent in the
theta-theoretic sense.’ Although such rationale clauses are still quite mysterious, their
semantics seems to require reference to a non-agent director.
20Interestingly, the director can be portrayed as the subject of sell much more easily than certain, appar-
ently similar cases. When the homeowner hires someone to fix the washing machine, it sounds disingenuous
to say I fixed my washing machine, and if you order (freshly prepared) takeout, it sounds simply false to
claim I cooked dinner. I suspect that this is a kind of blocking effect: a speaker is typically quite capable
of cooking dinner, so we imagine the speaker is acting as agent. However, few people want to dive into
the intricacies of selling one’s own house, so the involvement of a specialist can be more or less taken for
granted.
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(30) a. The statue has red eyes to scare the children away.
b. Grass is green to promote photosynthesis.
The characterization of strategic events given above suggests several subcases, depend-
ing on how the agent’s actions are related to the director’s plan. In one case, both
director and agent are aware of the goal, and the agent is acting cooperatively, in ac-
cord with the director’s plan. This occurs, for example, when a homeowner hires a
technician to fix the washing machine: the technician (the agent) intends to fix the
washing machine because the homeowner (the director) wants him to, and will take
whatever steps he believes will enable him to fix the washing machine. A second case
occurs when the director specifies instructions which can be followed multiple times
(for example, writing a concerto). The orchestra (the agent) may intend to follow the
composer’s instructions to the slightest detail, but the composer may have no idea that
the performance is even taking place. Finally, in more Machiavellian examples, the
director influences the behaviour of others in accordance with his own goals, without
the agent being aware of those goals. The agent has some local goal (to borrow the
director’s car, say), but in acting towards that goal, inadvertently fulfils the director’s
plan (removing the evidence from the scene of the crime). I collapse these subcases
here, because they all share the common characteristic of individuation on the basis of
a director’s plan, and can all be described with reference to that plan.
(31) a. The homeowner got his washing machine fixed.
b. The composer had her symphony performed.
c. The criminal got rid of the evidence.
However, strategic event descriptions need not dissociate director and agent. When
director and agent are identified, the line between intentional and strategic events can
be somewhat blurred. For instance, She’s leaving describes an intentional even when it
describes a possibly heterogeneous set of physical events from which an agent’s stable
intention is inferred, and describes a strategic event when it describes an established
plan which may not correspond to an observable set of actions. When the distinc-
tions between plan, action, and physical happenings are not clear, the same stuff may
correspond to physical, intentional, and strategic events.
This approach multiplies quite brazenly the number of events corresponding to a
particular portion of stuff. An actor who writes, directs, and performs a solo show
simultaneously carries out strategic, intentional, and physical events. This is a nec-
essary feature of a model of event individuation, though: the actor might write quite
brilliantly, but perform quite poorly, for example. As with Link’s new ring from old
gold and Davidson’s sphere rotating quickly and heating slowly in Section 2, the writ-
ing must be distinguished from the performance, even if both are related to the same
observable portion of stuff.
The strategic examples discussed so far are all culminated processes, but strategic
events from other classes can be found. A nonculminating process is described in (32):
dogs behave intentionally, but their intentions here are subsumed under those of the
speaker, who allows, or causes, the dogs to exercise. As in previous sections, Vendler’s
diagnostic tests show that walking the dogs is a temporally extended process without
an inherent culmination.
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(32) a. I’m walking the dogs.
b. I walked the dogs for/#in an hour.
As for a strategic culmination, imagine a society in which a suitably powerful person
can honour a visiting dignitary by arranging for several soldiers to fire their rifles si-
multaneously. As described in (33), this is necessarily strategic, as the queen has the
role of a director rather than a direct event participant. A sufficiently powerful queen
can initiate this ritual at a moment’s notice. Vendler’s tests diagnose a culmination with
no associated process.
(33) a. #The queen is honouring the visiting dignitary.
b. The queen (spontaneously) honoured the visiting dignitary at 1pm/#in
five minutes/#for five minutes.
3.4 Analytical events
We have now seen three variants on a common set of aspectual classes formed from
processes and culminations. A final possibility is that an event may not fit any of
the above templates, but may nonetheless be identified by the same formal criteria
discussed repeatedly above: individuation as diagnosed by anaphora, coupled with the
aspectual classes described in Section 2. Any participants in such an event may or may
not be aware that they form part of the event (in comparison, at least the agents and
directors in intentional and strategic events are aware of what type of event they form
part of).
In fact, the event may be construed as not having participants: the last ice age was
an event according to the above criteria (it can be referred to anaphorically, and has
the shape of a process of lowering of average temperature causing expansion of the
ice caps, culminating when the ice caps receded beyond a certain threshold), but with
no grammatically relevant participants (in particular, the ice age is not the same as
the spread of the ice caps or the drop in temperature). Accordingly, analytical events
are often described using simple event nominals (Grimshaw 1990, Roy and Soare
2013—see also Gärdenfors 2014 on different conceptual structures of verbs and event
nominals), event descriptions distinguished by their lack of argument structure. This
property, in turn, makes analytical events, as described by single event nominals, use-
ful for investigating the relationships and discrepancies between event structure and
argument structure.
Events like ice ages are only apparent to analysts, typically divorced from the events
themselves. Even if an individual is aware that she is in the middle of an ice age, this
knowledge is inevitably the product of analytical inquiry, rather than directly related to
that one individual’s experience.21 From this perspective, ice ages have something in
common with phenomena like population movements or the behaviour of stock mar-
kets: large-scale accumulations of events with emergent properties. Surely no one indi-
vidual intends to contribute to rural exodus, for example. Rather, multiple individuals
21The line here is again somewhat blurred. Link (1997) discusses events like the French revolution or
the scientific revolution, which have the properties of analytical events on the present typology. However,
participants in either event no doubt were aware that something revolutionary was going on, even if they
could not have been aware of the nature and extent of the revolution.
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or small groups move independently, in parallel, pursuing smaller-scale goals (jobs,
excitement, whatever draws people to cities). The process of rural exodus in France is
only apparent to someone who can see the aggregate of those individual histories, just
as patterns of change in glaciation are only apparent to someone who sees aggregate
data from across the centuries.
Analytical events are less rigidly characterized than physical, intentional, or strate-
gic events: any portion of stuff which fits into one of the spatiotemporal profiles de-
scribed in Section 2 can be construed as an analytical event. Analytical events are
therefore quite unrestricted; it is up to individuals to make judgements about the set of
actual analytical events. Indeed, apparently quite unruly portions of stuff can insight-
fully be seen as single events by the right analyst, as with the phenomena supporting
the postulation of the Earth’s revolving around the sun, or global warming, as analyt-
ical events.22 As with strategic events, we can also define a set of ‘strictly analytical
events’, which do not fall into any other category of events.
Of the examples considered so far, rural exodus and ice ages are processes: people
migrate from the country to the city for years, the earth cools for centuries. The migra-
tion out of Africa is a culminated process, or at least a set of culminated processes dis-
tinguished by their geographical endpoint (for example, people migrated from Africa
to Europe in a given amount of time). A clearer example of an analytical culminated
process is a typical extinction: although strictly speaking, the extinction of a species
is as instantaneous as the death of the last member of that species, the progressive test
indicates that we typically (but see below) construe extinction as a culminated process:
the giant panda, and Skolt Sami, are dying out, we say. Perhaps the closest approxima-
tions to analytical culminations are catastrophic global events like mass extinction of
dinosaurs: populist presentations often give the impression that dinosaurs were almost
instantaneously wiped out globally.23 The mass extinction of dinosaurs, if ascribed
these properties, has the form of an analytical culmination: it resists the progressive
(#After the meteor hit the earth, the dinosaurs were dying out), rejects for-PPs (The di-
nosaurs died out in/#for decades), and is too complex to be treated as a purely physical
event (die out and become extinct are collective predicates, which are sortally restricted
to species or similar groupings. Although extinction of a species clearly entails deaths
of the members of that species, a claim of extinction is really a universal claim to
be made by an analyst: members of that species used to exist, and now there are no
members of that species).24
Analytical events, then, can have any of the same shapes as other classes of event.
They are distinguished by the diminished role of any individual participants, and by the
fact that they often occur at timescales which are only apparent post facto to an analyst
who may not have observed the actual event.
22The Earth is a sphere spinning quickly and heating up slowly. Davidson would surely approve.
23Real-world culminations are never actually instantaneous, of course: they are simply very quick relative
to some contextual standard (compare culmination hop to process climb, for instance). Even a mass extinc-
tion that takes decades or centuries may be construed as a culmination from this perspective. This is another
case where temporal coarse-graining is required for a satisfactory empirical account.
24It is interesting that die out describes a culminated process in the case of the pandas, but a culmination
in the case of the dinosaurs, apparently because of world knowledge alone. This could be taken as evidence,
as in Mittwoch’s chapter, that the distinction between accomplishments and achievements is not as basic as
the distinctions between events, processes, and states.
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3.5 Interim summary
Section 2 discussed three temporal profiles shared by many event descriptions: pro-
cesses, culminated processes, and culminations. In this section, we have discussed
some orthogonal distinctions in the relations between event predicates and arguments.
1. Physical events concern dynamic physical configurations of event participants,
as well as beliefs about action at a distance as effected by devices like switches.
2. Intentional events are grounded in the perceived intentions underlying the ac-
tions of an agent: the event is perceived as an action performed by the agent as
a step towards an inferred goal, which may (but need not) be quite remote from
the observed process, and therefore more likely not to be reached.
3. Strategic events are like intentional events, except that the intention which de-
fines the event shape is that of a director who may not participate in the event
itself.
4. Analytical events often cannot be directly perceived, and are instead identified
analytically. The basis for individuation of an analytical event need not involve
a distinguished individual such as an agonist, agent, or director.
Each of these event types includes processes, culminations, and culminated processes,
but determines the roles of participants differently, as represented in the hierarchy of
increasingly constrained event types in Fig. 1.
The basis for individuation of physical and intentional events is perceived proper-
ties of grammatically realized event participants alone, while strategic and analytical
events are individuated otherwise (strategic events rely on the intentions of a non-
participant director, and analytical events rely on large-scale inferred patterns which
frequently abstract away from individual participants). Even if the migration out of
Africa must have been composed of individual physical and intentional events, it has
only an indirect relationship to the individuals that actually migrated out of Africa. If
any one individual, or even any fifty individuals, had not taken part in the migration,
the basic analytical fact of the migration would not change. Similarly, unlike smaller-
scale events, no one ‘snapshot’ would suffice to show that the migration was taking
place. The identity of an analytical event is related to the systematicity revealed by
generalization and abstraction. The relation of the individual to such large-scale ana-
lytical events is similar to the relationship between individuals and populations: we see
groups of participants as instances of the pattern identified by the analyst, rather than
constitutive of the pattern.
There are two general schemata for the individuation of non-analytical events, ac-
cording to dynamic configurations of individuals (physical events), or according to the
intentions of an agent (intentional and strategic events). In the latter case, the inten-
tions of a single individual grounds the individuation of the event, whereas this is not
the case with physical or analytical events.25 With the ball rolled down the hill or early
25One consequence of this latter distinction is that there need not be any participants identified in physical
event descriptions like It rained, any more than analytical event descriptions like the last ice age. We will
come back to the significance of this in the following section.
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humans migrated out of Africa, the event is delimited not just by the moving theme,
but also by the properties of the path-denoting PP. In contrast, with an intentional event
description like Susan carried Jeff into the sea, we do not care whether Jeff intended
to end up in the sea. He may or may not have been a willing participant; we just don’t
know. Even verbs which entail things about the intentions of participants other than
the agent, like persuade, make no commitment as to those intentions prior to the event
of persuading. It is an implicature, rather than an entailment, that if X persuaded Y to
Z, Y comes to intend to Z as a result of X’s actions. There is no contradiction in an
utterance like (34).
(34) Jeff persuaded Susan to carry him into the sea, but she didn’t really need per-
suading: she was intending to do it anyway.
This section has sketched the degrees of freedom in the relationship between an event’s
temporal properties and argument structure. At one extreme (physical events), the tem-
poral properties entirely determined by the force-dynamic tendencies of event partici-
pants; at the other extreme (analytical events), an event need not even be construed as
having participants. We now discuss a linguistic reflex of this taxonomy of events.
4 Linguistic constraints on event composition
So far, we have presented a taxonomy of event types, consisting of a set of aspec-
tual classes cross-classified with a set of statements about how we tend to individuate
events. The discussion has been largely based on event descriptions. The rationale
for this is that if something happens, and we have a way of describing it, then that
something is an event. Sometimes, the descriptions will be short on descriptive content
(chaos, that, etc.); sometimes, as with most examples in this chapter, not.
Our linguistic event descriptions have changed shape as we progressed from phys-
ical events to analytical events. We typically described physical events using clauses
like (35a), but used simple event nominals like (35b) for analytical events.
(35) a. The ball rolled down the hill.
b. The last ice age.
This is not a coincidence. There are ways of using noun phrases to refer to the event
described in (35a), for example in (36a), but there are no obvious verbal equivalents of
(35b), at least in English (see (36b)). Although sentences like (36c) are possible, they
are hardly verbal event descriptions; rather, they use a verb like happen as a means of
asserting the existence and temporal location of the event; the event description is still
nominal: (36c) can be paraphrased as ‘there is an event e, e is located prior to speech
time, and e is the last ice age’.
(36) a. (i) The ball’s movement/progress/trajectory (down the hill)
(ii) The event we just witnessed
(iii) That
b. (i) *It/there ice-aged (most recently).
(ii) *Ice aged.
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(iii) *The age was iced.
c. The last ice age happened/occurred/took place
We can find a definite noun phrase for any event we perceive (even if, in some cases,
the NP in question is just it or that). However, there are several events which cannot be
described by a verb, and those events tend to be analytical in nature.
We saw earlier that there are argument-structural correlates of the distinctions be-
tween different types of events. That suggests, in the spirit of Grimshaw 1990, that
verbal event descriptions are more restricted than simple event nominals because ver-
bal event descriptions must obey constraints on argument realization.26
Grimshaw shows that, on the one hand, simple event nominals clearly describe
events, as shown by their co-occurrence with predicates which are semantically re-
stricted to event-denoting arguments in (37).
(37) a. The war happened.
b. The race took two hours.
On the other hand, simple event nominals do not make the internal structure of those
events linguistically accessible in the same way in which complex event nominals or
verbs do: simple event nominals do not take in/for-PPs (38), and do not take any oblig-
atory arguments (39).
(38) #The race in/for two hours was exciting.
(39) a. John/*There raced ??(against Sam) yesterday.
b. John’s/the race (against Sam) took place yesterday.
This means that we can use relatively unconstrained simple event nominals as a com-
parison class to identify specifically linguistic constraints on other classes of event
description: certain events relate participants in a way which does not map well onto a
verb’s argument structure, given the constraints on the realization of verbal arguments.
In such cases, we may nevertheless be able to describe the event using a simple event
nominal. If so, we have found an event which is not well-described by a verb precisely
because of its internal structure.
We focus on near-universally accepted statements concerning argument structure
like the following:
1. The event participant hierarchy: syntactically realized event participants obey the
ordering INITIATOR > UNDERGOER > RESULTEE, where > represents asym-
metric c-command.27
26Most of what I say about verbal argument structure is also true of Grimshaw’s complex event nominals,
nominal event descriptions with argument structure. Because distinguishing different types of nominal event
description can be quite delicate, I only compare simple event nominals and verbs here. The interested reader
can consult Grimshaw (1990), or Moltmann’s chapter, for further details.
27Although similar in organization, the event participant hierarchy is conceptually distinct from the the-
matic hierarchies elaborated since Fillmore (1968), and strictly separated from the thematic hierarchy by
Grimshaw (1990) in an analysis of the thematically similar fear and frighten classes of psych-predicates (see
Jackendoff 1990 for related ideas). The specific terms used here are borrowed from Ramchand (2008) for
concreteness, although there is still some variation among researchers in how many roles are recognized.
Ramchand’s idea is that participants in causally prior subevents are more prominent than participants in
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2. A single event participant cannot be described by multiple arguments.
These are intended as building blocks in a theory of event structure and argument real-
ization. For further ingredients in a fuller theory, see chapters by Baglini & Kennedy,
Lohndal, Levin & Rappaport Hovav, Ramchand, Siloni, and Travis, as well as an ex-
tensive primary literature going back through Hale and Keyser (1993) to work in Gen-
erative Semantics such as McCawley (1968). Staggering amounts of research was done
in this area in the 1990s and 2000s (see Rosen 1999 for a summary of early results, and
work such as Borer 2005 and Ramchand 2008 for more recent proposals). We cannot
adequately summarize those results here, and will instead aim to show how constraints
on argument realization affect the linguistic description of the different event types
outlined above.
The restriction which emerges from these two constraints on verbal argument struc-
ture is that verbal event descriptions are usually asymmetric: verbs typically have ar-
guments, and a single argument, the initiator, is more prominent than all the others.
Putting alternations such as the passive aside, it is this argument which is realized as
the subject (the syntactic argument which asymmetrically c-commands all others in the
standard case).
Because of this, for example, there is no verb schlime such that (40a) and (40b) are
synonymous. This reflects the difficulty of finding a construal in which the mountain
initiates the climbing event.28
(40) a. John climbed the mountain.
b. The mountain schlimed John.
The same is true of strategic events: (41a) is an appropriate description of a strategic
event, but there is no verb schefeat to form (41b).
(41) a. William the Conqueror defeated the English.
b. The English schefeated William the Conqueror.
The asymmetric nature of intentional and strategic events feeds the asymmetry in verbal
descriptions of such events, as in (40)–(41). In other words, the agent in an intentional
event, and the director in a strategic event, are always construed as the initiators of
those events, so there is limited scope for variation in mapping of event participants
to syntactic positions. Much the same is true of agonists in physical events: to the
extent that the event has a single agonist, or ‘force-exerting entity . . . singled out for
focal attention’ (Talmy 1988: 53), that single agonist will reliably be identified as
caused subevents. For example, an initiator participates in a causing event, which brings about some result
involving the resultee, so initiators are more prominent than resultees. Ramchand treats intentions as a type
of cause, so this approach is also intended to cover intentional and strategic events, in the above terms.
28Pairs of verbs with apparent mirror-image argument structures do exist, with the best known being
experiencer alternations such as John likes pears and Pears please John. In many cases, at least one member
of such pairs is stative, in which case notions such as ‘initiator’ are inappropriate. In other cases, such as the
spray/load alternation (John loaded the truck with hay vs. John loaded the hay onto the truck), the symmetry
reflects two salient ways of construing the event, as bounded by the theme or the goal.
26
initiator.29,30
In contrast, our characterization of analytical events does not require such asym-
metry among participants. If an analytical event is to be described using a verb, an
asymmetry among participants must be imposed on the event.
There are a few ways to do this: many analytical events can be construed as having
an initiator—if not an agent or a director, a cause, as in (42a) or theme in (42b).
(42) a. Gavrilo Princip [the man who shot Fanz Ferdinand] started World War I.
b. Several small groups of humans migrated out of Africa.31
Finally, restrictions arising from the mapping of event participants to verbal arguments
can sometimes be overcome by choosing a verb with a simple argument structure: a 1-
or 0-place predicate. The single argument of a 1-place predicate can refer to a group or
mass, without differentiating the roles of subparts of that group or mass, as in (43).
(43) a. The volunteers spread out across the field.
b. Gondwanaland broke up.
As for 0-place predicates, the best-known are weather verbs. There is nothing which
forces the events described by weather verbs to be described by 0-place predicates:
(44a) and (44b) are equally valid descriptions of the same situation.
(44) a. It rained.
b. Rain fell from the sky.
In (44b), the rain is construed as a theme, or figure, moving away from the sky, a
source. In (44a), there is no such asymmetry, as there are no arguments.
If no such simple argument structure is available, but the complexity of the rela-
tions among event participants does not allow for straightforward identification of an
initiator, it will often not be possible to describe an event using a VP.
29Bridget Copley (p.c.) observes that there is a tendency for syntacticians to focus more on the process–
culmination model of event composition, and for semanticists to focus more on the mereological approach
we used to ground the process–culmination model in Section 2. As she notes, the relevance of the process–
culmination model to verbal argument structure (see e.g. Ramchand’s chapter) may ground syntacticians’
preference for that model. This suggests further explorations into the semantics of simple event nominals:
if particular argument-structural configurations necessarily describe quantized or cumulative events, with
process and culmination acting as an intermediary between argument structure and algebraic semantics, we
may expect temporal profiles other than those defined by process and culmination to be available to simple
event nominals. I have no idea if this is actually the case.
30There is some variation in description of strategic events, mainly concerning the phenomenon of sec-
ondary agentivity discussed above. The secondary agent can be omitted entirely, as in (41) (William the
Conqueror didn’t defeat the English single-handedly; rather, he instructed his army to act in a way which led
to the defeat of the English). It can also be included with verbs such as make or have (William the Conqueror
had his men attack the English, but not William the Conqueror had his men defeat the English). A range of
subtle consequences follow (for instance, compare I finally sold the house with I finally had the estate agent
sell the house—the former suggests a period of waiting for a buyer; the latter a period of indecision).
31A single person, or a single family, cannot migrate. Only largish populations can. But a migration can
be made up of multiple small-scale movements of individuals or families, with internal organization invisible
to anyone other than an analyst. I have no idea if the migration out of Africa actually had such properties;
all that matters is that we could describe an event with such properties, and it would have to be an analytical
event with several small groups of humans as its theme.
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The following is an example. A simple car crash, with two cars, can be described
as follows, either verbally with one car identified as the theme/initiator and the other
as the goal, as in (45a); verbally with no indication of asymmetry between the roles of
the two cars (45b); or nominally (45c).
(45) a. The red car crashed into the blue car.
b. Two cars collided.
c. The car crash
A more complex car crash, involving 27 cars in various ugly configurations, is more
likely to be described using a nominal: (46ai) is false; (46aii) is better, but still implies
a weak reciprocal reading, where 27 cars collided with each other. (46aiii) is more
accurate, but hopelessly circumlocutious. (46b) is looser: if, say, two cars crashed,
another went into the back of them, a fourth swerved to avoid them and hit a tree, the
distraction caused a fifth to lose control on the far side of the road, and so on, (46b)
would be an adequate description, but (46aii) would not, because the 27 cars did not
collide with each other.
(46) a. (i) #The red car crashed into 26 other cars.
(ii) 27 cars collided.
(iii) Several groups of cars collided; 27 cars were involved overall.
b. A 27-car pile-up.
A second example of the same phenomenon is in (47). Imagine a war involving five
countries, A, B, C, D and E, where the following propositions are all true.32
(47) a. A and B are fighting as allies against C.
b. A is fighting alone against D.
c. B is fighting alone against E.
We can describe this situation accurately using a conjunction of the three propositions
above, but how else can we describe it? (48ai) is almost accurate, but oversimplis-
tic, reducing a complex set of interactions to an antagonistic relationship between two
‘teams’. (48aii) seems unwarranted, implying that A–E all fought each other. The
nominal (48b), because it avoids any argument-structural commitments, seems less in-
accurate.
(48) a. (i) A and B fought C, D, and E.
(ii) A, B, C, D, and E fought.
b. The war
In both of these cases, as relations between a large set of participants become more
complex, it becomes increasingly hard to shoehorn the event description into a ver-
bal argument structure. As a consequence, it becomes increasingly natural to use an
argument-free, nominal event description.
32Wikipedia currently lists 114 countries which were implicated in World War II in a variety of ways.
Although I imagine that it is possible to see World War II as a two-sided fight between allies and axis, it is
clearly also possible to construe it in a way whose complexity far outstrips (47).
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The moral of the story, following Rosen (1999: 8), is that ‘verbs at least in part
mean what the syntax allows them to mean.’ These linguistic constraints on event
descriptions are partly language-particular. Languages other than English have broader
classes of 0-place verbal predicates than the weather verbs described above, whether
derived or basic. Perhaps the best known of these are impersonal passives in German















‘There was a war for years.’
The Serbo-Croatian example (though not necessarily the German impersonal passive)
implies the same kind of complexity, or abundance of activity, which could most fe-
licitously be described by the nominal examples above. Notably, idiomatic English
translations of (49) and (50) resort to a nominal event description, reflecting the ab-
sence of productive ways of forming verbal 0-place predicates in English. Verbs, to
an extent, mean what the syntax allows them to mean, but the syntax does not restrict
the meaning of simple event nominals. Asymmetries among participants in events with
initiators (whether agonists, agents, or directors) tend to be well-described by verbs;
other events, without such an articulation, are often better described by such nominals.
5 Summary
The Davidsonian parallel between individuals and events leads us to expect that events
can be individuated at a variety of levels of granularity, just as individuals can. This
appears to be true. However, just as with individuals, there are a range of perceptual
constraints on event individuation. We identified four different types of events (physi-
cal, intentional, strategic, and analytical), corresponding roughly to four different gran-
ularities, and saw that, despite the distinct individual properties of these different event
types, each shares a basic Vendlerian compositional template, consisting maximally of
a process leading to a culmination, or nonmaximally of either a process or a culmina-
tion in isolation.
A major distinction was drawn between physical, intentional, and strategic events,
in which there is a single privileged initiator argument, and analytical events, where
there need not be any such individual. However, we saw that effects relating to verbal
argument realization may impose such an asymmetry on arguments even when there is
no such asymmetry inherent to the event: in languages like English, in the vast major-
ity of verbal event descriptions there must be a syntactically most prominent argument
33Thanks to Berit Gehrke, Dejan Milacic, Ana Werkmann, and Vesela Simeonova for discussion of this
and related constructions.
29
corresponding to a semantically most prominent argument. In turn, this entails that
many very complex analytical events are most naturally described in English using
nominal, rather than verbal, event descriptions: simple event nominals do not need
arguments like verbal event descriptions typically do. This means that there are sys-
tematic linguistic constraints on a class of event descriptions in English, over and above
any perceptual restrictions on the shape of events.
In contrast, other languages have means of circumventing those linguistic con-
straints, by more productive use of 0-place verbal predicates. We saw two such ex-
amples above: the impersonal passive in German and other languages, and a particular
reflexive construction found in Serbo-Croatian and elsewhere. In such languages, verbs
can be used to describe events which do not readily lend themselves to verbal event de-
scriptions in languages like English.
In sum, we have seen a basic logical relation, of event composition, constrained
by perceptual factors relating to the individuation of events, and further constrained by
linguistic factors, both universal factors relating to argument structure such as the map-
ping between event participant roles and syntactic postions, and language-particular
factors such as the particular configurations of verbal arguments available in a given
language.
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